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1 Introduction
Successful rms rarely raise nancing only once in their liftetime. The key contribution
of this paper is to recognize that when they intend to raise fresh nancing, rmsexisting
capital structure shapes the "outside options" of both inside owners and outside investors,
i.e., the payo¤s that they can expect when no new nancing is raised. This link through
the respective "outside options" ensures that a young rms initial capital structure or
the target capital structure of a mature rm matter when the rm must raise additional
nancing, possibly at short notice, under asymmetric information.
While the notion that rmsnancial structure is shaped by problems of asymmetric
information has a long-standing tradition in the theory of corporate nance (Myers and
Majluf, 1984), our novel contribution is to embed the most standard problem of asymmetric
information into a simple, two-period dynamic model and, thereby, obtain a rich set of
implications from a single agency problem. We show when the "pecking order" theory
should hold or when it should fail to hold, and we show when rms should optimally
preserve "debt capacity" and when they should rather preserve "equity capacity" in order
to improve e¢ ciency.
Firms that expect to be locked-in with investors who exert substantial bargaining power
at later nancing rounds benet from initially preserving equity capacity so as to reduce
an underinvestment problem in the future. This allows to make it more attractive for
investors to nance future growth. Instead, rms that expect to receive future nancing at
competitive terms are better o¤preserving debt capacity so as to reduce an overinvestment
problem in the future. In this case, debt is used to reassure investors that only su¢ ciently
protable opportunities are nanced.
Our results speak to the question how rms should choose a target capital structure,
from which they then deviate when nancing is raised (at short notice) under asymmetric
information. By taking our two-period model more literally, we also relate our results to
the literature on venture capital and small-rm nancing. We derive conditions for when
rms optimally have low leverage initially, but subsequently increase leverage as they
raise additional nancing. We interpret our results also in terms of the use of convertible
securities. As we obtain quite di¤erent predictions for the optimal choice of leverage and its
change over time, depending on whether there is an over- or an underinvestment problem,
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our results help to organize the somewhat contradicting recent evidence. For instance, we
conrm the "pecking order" when additional capital can be raised at competitive terms.
If, instead, renancing conditions are determined by a relationship investor with strong
bargaining power, we predict that leverage decreases when new nancing must be raised
under asymmetric information.
The case in which rms can always raise (additional) nancing at competitive terms
is most closely related to the extant theoretical literature. Then, renancing under asym-
metric information will increase leverage, which conrms the predictions of the "pecking
order" (Myers and Majluf, 1984; Nachman and Noe, 1994). Debt nancing limits overin-
vestment. In fact, in our dynamic model, where the rm has an endogenously chosen initial
capital structure in place, we show that debt nancing may even ensure that investment
is rst-best e¢ cient. The rms optimal initial (or target) nancial structure maximally
preserves the rms "debt capacity". This increases e¢ ciency when future nancing is
needed. Firms with growth opportunities and access to competitive nancing should thus
have a low target leverage ratio and they should temporarily increase leverage when fresh
outside funding is needed. These predictions are overturned when rms are "locked-in"
with existing (relationship) investors, at least when future nancing has to be raised under
asymmetric information, e.g., at short notice. With a strong investor, renancing leads to
a reduction, rather than to an increase in leverage.
These richer predictions of our model are in line with recent evidence that does not
universally support the pecking order (Fama and French, 2005; Leary and Roberts, 2010).
One reason why incumbent investors may have bargaining power, which is when the peck-
ing order fails, is that their refusal to (co-)nance new investment may make it impossible
for the rm to raise new nancing elsewhere. Such a refusal sends a negative signal about
the rms overall prospects ("lemons"). For this case, we show that underinvestment can
result as investors seek to extract a larger share of the gains from a new investment. There
is less underinvestment if renancing leads to a decrease in the rms leverage. The opti-
mal initial capital structure should exhibit high leverage, as it preserves the rms "equity
capacity" and, thereby, mitigates the risk of future underinvestment.
We extend the most simple model of security design under asymmetric information in
a natural way, namely by making also the initial capital structure endogenous. When we
interpret the (initial) capital structure under symmetric information as rmslong-term
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choice, we obtain predictions both for rmstarget capital structure and for the direction
of deviations. The key distinction is whether rms can raise nancing competitively even
under asymmetric information, as this determines whether there will be a problem of over-
investment or underinvestment. The initial (or target) capital structure a¤ects e¢ ciency
as it shapes the "outside options" of both insiders and initial outside investors. In terms
of predictions, we argue that (large) rms that can raise capital at competitive terms
also under asymmetric information will do so by issuing debt, though their target capital
structure involves little debt, but small rms facing a specialized or relationship investor
will issue equity when they need additional nancing, though their target capital structure
involves high leverage. These predictions are in line with ndings by Shyam-Sunder and
Myers (1999) or Frank and Goyal (2003). It has also been documented that equity is
often raised by rms that are not under duress (Fama and French, 2005), possibly so as to
thereby stock-pile debt capacity (Lemmon and Zender, 2009). In contrast, smaller growth
rms have been shown to issue debt when asymmetric information is not a factor, so as to
preserve equity capacity for the long run (Leary and Roberts, 2010; Gomes and Phillips,
2005). We discuss below in more detail our implications and how they compare to existing
ndings.
Our di¤erent results, depending on whether there is a problem of under- or overinvest-
ment when nancing must be raised under asymmetric information, also help to organize
some recent conicting evidence on start-up and young rm nancing. For this interpreta-
tion we take our two-stage model of nancing more literally. The optimal choice of securi-
ties over time then depends crucially on outside investor versus owner-manager bargaining
power.1 Such a di¤erence in bargaining power may, for instance, arise from di¤erences in
the legal environment (e.g., Lerner and Schoar, 2005; Cumming 2005, 2008; Kaplan et al.,
2007). We show that if bargaining power is in the hands of the owner-manager at the
renancing stage, then it is optimal to initially nance with junior securities and to switch
to more senior securities at later stages. In accordance with this prediction, the above
studies nd that in countries with weak creditor rights or weak enforcement of these rights
equity is more frequently issued in rst rounds and for younger companies. More successful
rms then issue more senior securities in later rounds of nancing (in particular, Kaplan
1With regards to bank lending, see Degryse and Ongena (2008) for a review of the empirical evidence
on "rent-extraction" over the duration of a bank-borrower relationship.
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et al., 2007). In contrast, if rms face a strong investor, our results prescribe the opposite
behavior, and rms should then initially raise nance through issuing senior claims. In
line with this result, start-up rms in countries with a strong protection of creditor rights
and strong law enforcement issue securities that initially give the investor downside protec-
tion, but which may be converted to more junior claims with a higher upside participation
during expansion in later nancing rounds (e.g., Kaplan and Strömberg, 2003).
In terms of corporate nance theory, a novel contribution of our model is to solve for a
security design problem under asymmetric information where both the privately informed
owner-manager and the original investors already have a stake in the company. Their
existing claims create "outside options", whose value depends on the rms protability
when no new nancing is raised. Technically, we thus solve for a game of screening (when
the investor has bargaining power) and a game of signaling (when the owner-manager
has bargaining power) with so-called type-dependent reservation values.2 By a¤ecting the
"outside options" at the renancing stage, the rms initial nancing structure becomes
relevant even though it is chosen under symmetric information. We obtain conditions when
despite private information at the renancing stage, the outcome is e¢ cient, i.e., there is
no under- or overinvestment. This is made possible as also the value of the stakeholders
"outside options" depends on the rms protability. Since in practice (fresh) nancing is
frequently raised when the rm already has outstanding securities, our two-period model
of nancing under asymmetric information should add realism.3
There is a growing body of research on the dynamics of a rms optimal capital struc-
ture, trading o¤tax benets, bankruptcy and agency costs, or the occurrence of technology
shocks, for instance, (cf., Hennesy and Whited, 2005; Miao, 2005). In contrast to this liter-
ature, we derive our results from a single ine¢ ciency, namely interim private information,
in a stylized two-period setting. In a related paper, Axelson et al. (2009) also take a
security design approach in a model with interim private information. Similarly to our
case of a "weak" investor at the renancing stage, they derive debt as the unique interim
security. This conrms the predictions of Myers and Majlufs (1984) pecking order theory
(cf., also Nachman and Noe, 1994). In our model, however, (re)nancing is not always
2As we argue below, however, a single security instead of a menu is always optimal at the renancing
stage.
3In di¤erent contexts, the role of (type-dependent) outside options has recently been explored, for
instance, by Tirole (2011) and Burkart and Lee (2011).
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optimal for the owner-manager, as the existing capital structure serves as an outside op-
tion. The overinvestment problem is then less severe. In fact, as we noted above, rst-best
investment may be achieved, and the pecking order is reversed if the bargaining power
shifts to the uninformed investor.4 Though DeMarzo and Du¢ e (1999) and Biais and
Mariotti (2005) also consider a two-stage game, the security in their models is designed
before private information is revealed, and ultimately only a single security is issued.
The separation of initial nancing and possible renancing relates our paper also to
the literature on stage nancing, which is a well documented fact in start-up nance
(e.g., Gompers, 1995; Kaplan and Strömberg, 2003). A number of authors have used
staging in a security design context when there is no commitment to renancing (e.g.,
Cornelli and Yosha, 2003). Further, following Aghion and Bolton (1992), several papers
have motivated the use of contingent securities in venture capital nancing in the context
of incomplete contracting (e.g., Berglöf, 1994). We add to this literature by obtaining
unique and contrasting optimal securities from an interim adverse selection problem. Our
contribution lies especially in showing how variations in bargaining power, as arising from
di¤erent legal environments or di¤erent stages of rm development, signicantly change
optimal security design.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model. Section
3 examines the optimal initial and interim nancing when the investor has bargaining
power at the renancing stage. Section 4 characterizes security design when the owner-
manager has bargaining power at the interim stage. Empirical implications of our results
are presented in Section 5, and Section 6 concludes. All proofs are in the Appendix.
2 The Model
We envisage a rm that raises nancing in an initial period, t = 1, and that raises additional
nancing in a subsequent period, t = 2. Precisely, suppose that at t = 1 a penniless owner-
manager ("she") needs to raise initial nancing K1 > 0. At t = 2, another investment
4The optimal ex ante nancing in our model, which is chosen under symmetric information, is also
very di¤erent from Axelson et al. (2009). They propose a mixture of debt and levered equity: Debt is used
to deter the entry of fraudulent entrepreneurs, while levered equity mitigates the risk shifting incentives
caused by debt nancing. In one of our cases we also obtain that levered equity may be optimal, because
it reduces overinvestment in later stages. What drives this result, however, is the role of levered equity
for outside options in the renancing negotiations.
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K2 > 0 can be made. We argue below why it is not possible to raise all nancing initially.
For simplicity only, we assume that the investment opportunity in t = 2 arises with
probability one. The investment opportunity will be protable only sometimes, though.
Cash ows are realized in the nal period, t = 3. Both the owner-manager and investors
are risk neutral, and we abstract from discounting. We next add more details to our model.
Financing and Contracting The rms veriable cash ow at t = 3 is either low or
high: xl  0 or xh > xl. The likelihood of realizing high cash ow depends both on
whether additional capital was injected at t = 2 and on the rms underlying protability
(its "type"). This is made precise when discussing the information structure below. Our
restriction to only two cash ows is only for convenience, as results can be generalized to
a setting with a continuous cash-ow distribution (cf. on the respective generalization of
assumptions footnote 6 below).
To raise K1 at t = 1, the ownermanager issues a security R1(x) that conditions the
repayment on the nal cash ow. The rm can initially raise capital competitively, so
that the resulting security design problem will be to maximize the ex-ante value of the
owner-managers claims. For this reason, we stipulate that at t = 1 the owner-manager
can o¤er R1(x) to investors.
Raising nancing at t = 2, provided this is successful, involves a fresh injection ofK2 by
the investor. Then, the initial security R1(x) that is held by outside investors is replaced
by a new security R2(x). Here, it is convenient to suppose that all outside claims are held
by one investor. However, as we argue below our results are applicable more broadly, so
that there could be, for instance, fresh nancing from new investors. But we also discuss
applications where it is reasonable that there is a single investor, e.g., a housebank or a
venture capital investor. We also discuss below how our two stages, t = 1 and t = 2, can
be interpreted as representing a rms long-term and short-term choice of nancing and
leverage.
We make the standard assumptions that 0  Rt(x)  x and that both Rt(x) and
x   Rt(x) are nondecreasing. According to the rst assumption, the security can only
distribute the cash ows that are realized by the rm. As the owner-manager is assumed
to be penniless, the relevant restriction is that Rt(x)  0: The security can not specify
a "wage" that is paid to the owner-manager over and above the rms cash ow. This
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assumption is common in the literature. Such a payment could lure "non-serious" operators
into the market. Also, it is common to assume that both Rt(x) and x   Rt(x), i.e., the
payouts to outside investors and the owner-manager, are nondecreasing. Otherwise, either
party could have an incentive to "destroy" cash ow by obstructing the operations of the
rm.
Information The rms protability can take on two values. We refer to these as a
good or bad "state",  = fB;Gg. A priori, the likelihood of  = G is given by 0 < bq < 1.
At t = 1, this is common knowledge between the owner-manager and potential investors.
At t = 2, when the renancing decision must be made, the owner-manager has already
gained an informational advantage regarding , which she cannot credibly share with the
investor, at least not at such short notice. Based on this private information, the posterior
belief of the owner-manager regarding Pr ( = G) is q. We refer to the owner-managers
private information q as her "type" at t = 2. It is a priori distributed according to some
CDF F (q) over q 2 [0; 1], satisfying bq = R qdF (q).5
Together with the decision whether to renance at t = 2, d 2 D := fY;Ng ("Yes" and
"No"), the rms protability  = fB;Gg determines the probability of high cash ows:
pd. Assuming that pdG > pdB holds for all d 2 D,  = G can be unambiguously referred
to as the "good" sate irrespective of whether renancing was obtained or not. Further,
renancing has a larger impact on the rms upside potential if the rms protability is
 = G rather than  = B, i.e., if the rms prospects are generally more attractive:
pY G=pNG > pY B=pNB: (1)
We discuss the importance of condition (1) for our characterization of unique optimal
securities below. Note that it implies that pY G   pNG > pY B   pNB.6
5Alternatively, we may, instead, stipulate that the owner-manager privately observes some signal #,
which is generated by the CDFs 	(#). We can then generate q as well as F (q) by using Bayesrule.
6As noted above, our results can be generalized to a setting with a continuous cash-ow distribution.
Formally, with a CDF Hd (xj) for all combinations d = fY;Ng and  = fG;Bg we can rst generalize
pd (x) := 1 Hd (xj). Assume that the distribution for G dominates that for B in terms of conditional
stochastic dominance (CSD): pdG (x0jz)  pdB (x0jz) for x0; z 2 X, where pd (xjz) is the conditional
probability 1  Pr (x0  x  x0 + z). This implies that high cash ows are increasingly more probably in
state G compared to state B: @@x

pdG(x)
pdB(x)

 0. Further, to generalize condition (1), we would require that
pYG(x)
pYB(x)
 pNG(x)pNB(x) holds for all x. We have shown in a working-paper version how these assumptions jointly
ensure that all our subsequent results on optimal security design extend to a setting with a continuous
cash-ow distribution.
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Discussion of Contracting For our analysis, we distinguish two cases for the game that
proceeds at the renancing stage t = 2. We capture the case where the rm is "locked-in"
with the initial investor by granting the investor all bargaining power: It is the investor who
makes a take-it-or-leave-it o¤er. When there is no such "lock-in", the owner-manager has
all bargaining power. Then, it is the owner-manager who makes a take-it-or-leave-it o¤er.
While these two settings are certainly extreme, they allow to capture the fundamental
sources of ine¢ ciency that arise from asymmetric information.
After deriving our rst characterization, we will be more explicit about endogenizing
a possible "lock-in", e.g., through an additional layer of information asymmetry between
initial investors and new investors at t = 2. Then, we will also motivate our assumption
that not all of the required funds, K1 + K2, are raised initially and that we can indeed
restrict attention to a sequence of simple contractual games: raising initial nancing in
t = 1 through R1(x) and renancing in t = 2 through an exchange for R2(x).
Additional Notation and Parameter Restriction To ease exposition, we use the
following short-hand notation: Rtl := R
t(xl) denotes the repayment for low cash ow,
Rt := Rt(xh)  Rt(xl) denotes the outside investors upside, and x := xh   xl denotes
the upside of the whole rm. One can then represent the investors payo¤ when there is
renancing at t = 2 as
vY (R
2; q) := R2l + (pY B + q (pY G   pY B))R2  K2;
depending on the renancing security contract R2 and the owner-managers private infor-
mation (his "type") q. Note that the payo¤ is gross of the initial outlay K1, but net of
K2. Likewise, denote the investors expected payo¤ without renancing by
vN(R
1; q) := R1l + (pNB + q (pNG   pNB))R1:
Total expected cash ow in either case is given by the joint surplus
sY (q) : = xl + (pY B + q (pY G   pY B))x K2;
sN(q) : = xl + (pNB + q (pNG   pNB))x:
With this at hands, the owner-managers expected payo¤ can be written as
uN(R
1; q) : = sN(q)  vN(R1; q);
uY (R
2; q) : = sY (q)  vY (R2; q):
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To limit trivial case distinctions, we suppose that renancing is e¢ cient only in  = G:
(pY B   pNB)x < K2 < (pY G   pNG)x: (2)
This implies that there exists a cuto¤ 0 < qFB < 1, so that renancing increases the joint
surplus only if the owner-managers type (the probability of being in G) is above qFB.
Similarly, it is convenient to stipulate that
K1 > xl;
as this allows to rule out the use of safe debt. Throughout the analysis we assume that
the rm is nancially viable at t = 1 under the respective optimal contracts.7
3 The Case with a Strong Investor
We proceed backwards and take rst the renancing stage at t = 2. The equilibrium
outcome is then plugged into the problem that arises at the initial nancing stage, t = 1.
Recall that we presently consider a game where the investor can make a take-it-or-leave-it
o¤er to the owner-manager at t = 2. Hence, while initially the rm faces a competitive
market for capital, the initial investor has bargaining power vis-à-vis the (locked-in) rm
when it needs renancing at t = 2.
3.1 Renancing (Strong Investor)
To obtain renancing K2, the owner-manager must agree to replace the existing security
R1 by R2, as proposed by the investor. Otherwise, no new capital K2 is injected and the
original security R1 stays in place.
Denote the set of all types q who accept the o¤er by q 2 A  [0; 1]. That is, uY (R2; q) 
uN(R
1; q) holds for all q 2 A, and uY (R2; q) < uN(R1; q) otherwise.8 Then, the investors
expected payo¤ at t = 2 is given byZ
A
vY (R
2; q)dF (q) +
Z
[0;1]=A
vN
 
R1; q

dF (q) : (3)
The investors objective is thus to choose R2 so as to maximize (3), subject to the imposed
"feasibility" constraints for R2: 0  R2(x)  x and that both R2(x) and x   R2(x) are
non-decreasing. This program is solved next.
7After deriving the optimal contracts, a condition that is both necessary and su¢ cient can be obtained,
albeit only implicitly in terms of the primitives.
8Resolving the owner-managers indi¤erence in this way will be inconsequential for the further analysis.
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Optimal Renancing Security Arguably, the best that the investor can do is to ensure
that the e¢ cient decision is made while extracting the full surplus from renancing. We
show that this may be feasible even though the owner-manager has private information
about the benets from renancing. This requires that each owner-manager type q 2 A is
exactly indi¤erent between accepting and rejecting the investors o¤er:
uY (R
2; q) = uN(R
1; q) 8q 2 [0; 1], (4)
so that for the incremental payo¤ of the investor it indeed holds that
vY (R
2; q)  vN(R1; q) = sY (q)  sN(q):
Note that this is just a formal restatement of the requirement that the investor extracts
the whole NPV from the new investment. Note that for the owner-manager it is from (4)
indeed optimal to choose the acceptance set A = [qFB; 1]. Resolving his indi¤erence (for
all q) in this way is, however, not an assumption: It clearly must apply in equilibrium,
provided that such a contract R2 is feasible, as otherwise the investor could marginally
adjust the contract to break the managers indi¤erence to the left and the right of q = qFB.
We now construct the respective security so that (4) is satised, which we denote by
R2 = bR. As it implements the rst-best acceptance decision, we also refer to it as the
"rst-best" security, though it should be recalled that it also allows the investor to extract
all incremental surplus from renancing. For any initial security R1, one can solve (4) to
obtain the "upside"  bR and the respective safe repayment, bRl:
 bR = x  pNG   pNB
pY G   pY B
 
x R1 ; (5)
bRl = R1l   pNB  x R1+ pY B x  bR : (6)
We rst comment on the properties of this contract before discussing when it is feasible.
The characterization in (5), together with condition (1), imply that bR > R1, while from
(6) it then follows that bRl < R1l . Hence, the "rst-best" security bR o¤ered in t = 2 is
unambiguously steeper from the investors perspective than the initial security R1. The
intuition is immediate. Recall that renancing has a larger impact on expected cash ows
when the rm is more protable,  = G, compared to when  = B (cf. condition (1)). To
keep all types q indi¤erent between the old security and the new security with additional
nancing, as required by (4), the owner-manager must receive less from the upside and
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more from the safe cash ow under security R2, compared to the initial security R1. Only
then will she be indi¤erent between renancing and non-renancing for all q. Consequently,
the claims held by the outside investor, R2 = bR, are strictly steeper than under the initial
security R1.
The "rst-best" security, bR, may not be feasible, though. This is the case when the
new security can not be made su¢ ciently steep, as bR would require that bRl < 0, which is
not feasible. That is, in order to indeed extract the full surplus from the new investment,
the investor would have to demand a security with a "negative repayment" bRl < 0.9
The optimal feasible security will then be atter than bR, and not all of the surplus from
renancing can be extracted by the investor. That is, the di¤erence in the owner-managers
expected payo¤ with and without renancing, uY (R2; q)   uN (R1; q), is no longer zero
everywhere, as it is when R2 = bR, but it is strictly increasing in q. For this case, denote
the unique point of intersection of uY (R2; q) and uN (R1; q) by q:10
uY
 
R2; q

= uN
 
R1; q

: (7)
The set of owner-manager types who accept the renancing o¤er in t = 2 becomes thus
A = [q; 1]: The owner-manager prefers to accept R2 if q  q and strictly so if q > q,
while she prefers to reject the new o¤er if q < q. All types q > q now receive an
information rent of size
uY (R
2; q)  uN
 
R1; q

: (8)
For each type q > q, we can say that the rent (8) is a payo¤ that the investor
loses, as he presently can exert his bargaining power when proposing the security R2.
Consequently, the investor wants to make the expected rent as small as possible. Note
that for each q > q, the rent (8) is arguably smaller when the owner-managers expected
payo¤ under renancing becomes atter. To make uY (R2; q) atter, i.e., to decrease the
slope everywhere, the owner-managers residual claim x R2(x)must become atter, which
in turn requires that the investors claim R2 becomes steeper. Hence, if bR is not feasible,
the best the investor can do is to make the new security R2 as steep as possible, through
9As noted above, this could prescribe a wage that is paid to the owner-manager regardless of the rms
performance, which - following standard restrictions - we excluded.
10While we could simply set q = 0 for the case where there is no intersection as also uY
 
R2; q = 0

>
uN
 
R1; q = 0

, this case will not arise by optimality for the investor. In fact, we show that always
q  qFB .
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maximizing R2, while ensuring that R2 remains feasible.
Proposition 1 Suppose that there is a strong investor, who makes the o¤er at the re-
nancing stage. Then, when renancing is successful, the investor holds a security R2 that
is steeper than the initial security R1: R2l  R1l and R2  R1 (the inequalities are
strict if initially R1l > 0 or R
1 < x). We further have the following case distinction:
(i) If
R1l 

pY GpNB   pY BpNG
pY G   pY B
 
x R1 (9)
holds, then the "rst-best" security R2 = bR, as characterized in (5)-(6), is feasible and
uniquely optimal, in which case the renancing decision is always e¢ cient: There is re-
nancing if and only if q  q = qFB.
(ii) Otherwise, i.e., if (9) does not hold, the new security is levered equity with R2l = 0;
and there is renancing if and only if q  q. There is underinvestment as qFB < q < 1.
Proof. See Appendix.
We postpone the discussion of condition (9), as we presently take the initial security R1
as given. Hence, we return to this condition once we have solved also for the optimal initial
security R1. If condition (9) does not hold, Proposition 1 pins down levered equity with
R2l = 0 as the uniquely optimal shape of the optimal security at the renancing stage. This
maximally shifts the claim of the owner-manager to the low cash-ow realization and that
of the investor to the high cash-ow realization. By thereby making the investors payo¤
from renancing as steep as possible and that of the owner-manager as at as possible,
the owner-managers information rent is minimized. Note that we presently take a general
security design perspective and thus consider the full replacement of the initial security
R1 by a new security R2. After deriving the optimal initial security R1 in the following
section, we o¤er more interpretation for Proposition 1, e.g., in terms of a change in leverage
or in terms of converting an existing security.
Rephrasing the Investors Trade-O¤ If bR is not feasible (cf. case ii) in Proposition
1), the investor faces a trade-o¤between maximizing surplus and reducing the information
rent that the owner-manager can extract. The solution of this trade-o¤results in ine¢ cient
renancing: q > qFB, so that there is underinvestment at the renancing stage. It
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remains to pin down the resulting cuto¤ q. For this we can now substitute the cuto¤ rule,
i.e., A = [q; 1], into the investors objective function (3). Further, in case of ine¢ cient
renancing, we can substitute R2l = 0, as we know that levered equity is the uniquely
optimal renancing security. We are thus left with a single remaining contracting variable
to solve for, R2. From the owner-managers indi¤erence condition for q (cf. condition
(7)) we obtain the upside of the investors repayment R2 as a monotonic function of
q. Implicitly di¤erentiating (7) yields dR2=dq > 0: As R2 increases, the investor
extracts more from the upside and the owner-manager is left with a smaller share, so that
only higher types of the owner-manager still nd it optimal to accept the renancing o¤er,
which pushes up q. Taken together, we can thus di¤erentiate the investors prots (3)
with respect to q to obtain the rst-order condition
  [sY (q)  sN(q)] f (q) + dR
2
dq
Z 1
q
dvY (R
2; q)
dR2
dF (q) = 0: (10)
(For a more explicit derivation, including dR2=dq, see the proof of Proposition 1). The
second term in (10) captures the benets from "implementing" a higher q and, thereby,
extracting a higher payo¤ from all types q > q. The respective loss in surplus, given that
the underinvestment problem becomes more severe, is captured by the rst term in (10).
Discussion If the incumbent investor makes the renancing o¤er, as an expression of his
bargaining power, the outcome can be ine¢ cient, as there may be underinvestment. The
investors o¤er then trades o¤ joint surplus maximization with information rent extrac-
tion. This rent for the owner-manager arises as she is privately informed about the rms
protability . As discussed above, this can capture the notion that renancing must be
raised at su¢ ciently short notice.
Note that while we restrict the investor to making a single o¤er, R2, this is without
loss of generality, as it is straightforward to show that the investor would not gain from
o¤ering a menu of securities. Intuitively, any non-degenerate menu of contracts would
have to include also a atter security, which the owner-manager would choose for lower
values q, thereby realizing more instead of less information rent.
As we noted above, the fact that the owner-managers prot without renancing also
depends on the type q ("type-dependent outside option") may even allow the investor to
extract all surplus. This leaves the owner-manager with zero information rent, making the
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outcome e¢ cient. This interaction between the initial security R1 and the e¢ ciency of the
renancing decision under the investors optimal o¤er R2 is explored next, as we solve for
the initial stage t = 1.
3.2 Raising Initial Finance (Strong Investor)
Initially, at t = 1, there is no private information, and nancing can be raised at compet-
itive terms. We model this by granting the owner-manager the right to make the o¤er to
the investor. Using that ud (Rt; q) = sd (q)  vd (Rt; q), she maximizes her expected payo¤Z q
0
 
sN (q)  vN
 
R1; q

dF (q) +
Z 1
q
 
sY (q)  vY
 
R2; q

dF (q) (11)
subject to the participation constraint of the investor at t = 1Z q
0
vN
 
R1; q

dF (q) +
Z 1
q
vY
 
R2; q

dF (q)  K1; (12)
where, importantly, q and R2 are determined at the interim stage. Note that, to simplify
the exposition, we have presently assumed that, for given R1, the investor chooses a pure
strategy in t = 2, so that R2 and q are pinned down uniquely. As we show in the
proof of Proposition 2, in analogy to a tie-breaking condition, this must indeed hold in
equilibrium, even though once we arrive at t = 2, the investors program may not be
strictly quasiconcave.
Suppose rst that there is ine¢ ciency at the interim stage irrespective of the security
contract that was o¤ered initially. Below we present a simple condition when this is the
case.
Proposition 2 Take the case with a strong investor who determines the renancing terms
at t = 2. Then, if there is underinvestment at t = 2 (q > qFB), it is uniquely optimal for
the rm to raise initial nancing at t = 1 through a debt contract, R1l = xl.
Proof. See Appendix.
Debt is the attest security from the investors perspective and thus the steepest secu-
rity from the owner-managers perspective. Recall that if there is ine¢ ciency at t = 2 (cf.
the rst-order condition (10)), it is due to the fact that the investor wants to extract more
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of the owner-managers information rent. If the initial claim R1 becomes atter, the owner-
managers residual claim and thus also her expected payo¤without nancing (her "outside
option") become steeper in q. This reduces her information rent, uY (R2; q) uN (R1; q) > 0
for all q > q, where we know from Proposition 1 that R2 is levered equity. As the owner-
managers information rent is reduced, it has less weight in the maximization problem of
the investor at t = 2. Therefore, he resolves the trade-o¤ between rent extraction and
e¢ ciency by making a renancing o¤er that leads to a lower, more e¢ cient q. Put dif-
ferently, raising the initial amount K1 through debt nancing preserves the rms upside
potential - its "equity capacity" - for the latter round of nancing. The potential to replace
the initial security by a relatively steeper ("levered equity") security allows then to reduce
underinvestment.
What matters is thus how steep the new security in case of renancing, R2, can become
relative to the initial security R1. It is through this channel that the initial nancing
decision a¤ects e¢ ciency at the renancing stage. Even though initial nancing is chosen
under symmetric information (and absent any other agency problem, for that matter),
Proposition 2 still pins down a unique security. Debt preserves the maximum "equity
capacity" to alleviate the underinvestment problem in t = 2.
Observe now from condition (9) that an e¢ cient outcome in t = 2 is feasible only if
R1l is su¢ ciently high. Only then can the new security R
2 = bR be made su¢ ciently steep
relative to R1. Denote the maximum feasible joint surplus, after subtraction of the initial
outlay K1, by
SFB :=
Z qFB
0
sN (q) dF (q) +
Z 1
qFB
sY (q) dF (q) K1
and, to ease notation for the rest of the paper, let
pd (q) := pdB + q (pdG   pdB) for d = fY;Ng : (13)
We derive now a simple condition showing when it is feasible to construct an initial security
that leads the investor to implement the e¢ cient cuto¤ q = qFB and when, instead, it
holds at t = 2 that q > qFB.
Proposition 3 If a strong investor determines the renancing conditions in t = 2, the
rst-best investment outcome (q = qFB) is obtained if
xl  pNBpY G   pY BpNG
(pY G   pY B)pN(bq) SFB + (pNG   pNB)pY (bq)(pY G   pY B)pN(bq) max (0; SFB   pN(bq)x) ; (14)
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while otherwise there is underinvestment with q > qFB. In both cases, the security that
is held by the investor after renancing is unambiguously steeper from the investors per-
spective than the initial security (R2 > R1 and R2l < R
1
l ).
Proof. See Appendix.
Condition (14) is intuitive in light of the previous discussion. If xl is large enough,
the owner-manager can ensure that the investor just breaks even with a security that is
su¢ ciently at for the investor so that, at t = 2; the "rst-best" security is feasible. Also
in this case renancing will lead to a strictly steeper security for the investor. However,
if condition (14) holds strictly, the initial security R1 is not pinned down uniquely. In
this case there is some leeway in choosing the optimal security R1 while still realizing the
e¢ cient outcome.
Incidentally, if (14) does not hold, so that there will be underinvestment in equilibrium,
the owner-manager could still o¤er an initial security that would subsequently induce rst-
best renancing with q = qFB, albeit then the investor would realize strictly more than
what is required to make him break even. That is, the investors ex-ante expected payment
would strictly exceed his expected capital outlay. (Trivially, this would always be the case
if the owner-manager no longer had a stake in the rm as R1 = R2 = x.) This is, however,
never optimal. Intuitively, at q = qFB a marginal distortion has a zero rst-order e¤ect
on total surplus, while a reduction in the investors ex-ante payo¤ has a rst-order e¤ect
on the owner-managers payo¤.11
3.3 Discussion
Taken together, Propositions 2 and 3 make the following assertions. If renancing is
obtained from a strong investor, e.g., an investor with whom the rm is presently "locked-
in", then the claims held by outside investors should become steeper after renancing.
There is scope for underinvestment, especially for rms that repay little in case of failure,
relative to total prots (when condition (14) does not hold). Somewhat loosely speaking,
such a problem of underinvestment at the renancing stage should thus be expected more
11Note that we do not use for our arguments that under the optimal initial security, R1, the investor
just breaks even. Debt is uniquely optimal in Proposition 2 as it allows to reduce underinvestment in
t = 2 for any given level of the investors ex-ante payo¤. The e¢ ciency gains obtained thereby accrue to
the owner-manager.
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for rms with a more severe downside risk. To reduce this ine¢ ciency, the rm will
initially raise nancing through debt, thereby choosing high leverage. When renancing is
obtained, the change in outside investorsclaims reduces leverage. Precisely, for the case
with underinvestment, we obtain that outside nancing turns into levered equity at the
renancing stage. In Section 5, after we have characterized the outcome also for the case
with a weak investor, we o¤er various interpretations for these results and relate them to
existing evidence on rmschoice of nancing.
Assumptions and Interpretation An important feature of our model, which is shared
with many of the nancial contracting models that we reviewed in the Introduction, is that
the owner-manager does not raise K1 + K2 ex ante. This can be endogenized with the
existence of an unlimited supply of fraudulent entrepreneurs who realize zero cash ow
regardless of how much capital is sunk. Precisely, suppose that at t = 1 there is a publicly
observable, but unveriable signal whether the entrepreneur is such a "y-by-night opera-
tor" (Rajan, 1992). Then, if the owner-manager had the unconditional right to decide on
K2, a fraudulent owner-manager could "blackmail" outside investors by demanding a su¢ -
ciently large transfer in return for paying back K2. Conferring the right to stop renancing
to the investor, which is equivalent to the stipulated staging of nancing, renders entry for
such fraudulent entrepreneurs unprotable. On the other hand, presently this feature of
contracting exposes the rm to a hold-up problem. If both securities (R1; R2) were spec-
ied ex-ante, clearly the option to withhold renancing, together with the distribution
of bargaining power, would still ensure that R2 is renegotiated in the investors interest
alone (i.e., as given in Proposition 1). A renegotiation-proof contract (R1; R2) could be
interpreted also as a (single) convertible security, which exchanges senior nancing R1 for
junior nancing R2 when additional capital, K2, is injected.
As noted in the Introduction, the present case where the rm is locked-in may capture
various forms of relationship nancing. We relate our results to the respective empirical
evidence in Section 5. Formally, such a "lock-in" can be obtained when there is an infor-
mation asymmetry between the original investor and new investors. In fact, our model
could be readily extended by introducing an additional layer of information asymmetry
between the owner-manager and the original investor, on one side, and new investors in
t = 2, on the other side. New investors would then face a "lemons problem" when being
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asked to fund all or a part of K2. This may make access to new investors very costly or
even impossible for the rm at t = 2 (cf. Sharpe, 1990; Rajan, 1992).12
4 The Case with a Weak Investor
We now consider the case in which the owner-manager has all the bargaining power also at
the renancing stage. We capture this, in analogy to the previous Section, by stipulating
that she makes a take-it-or-leave-it o¤er R2. This gives rise to a game of signaling, as at
t = 2 the owner-manager is privately informed about the probability of the good state,
q. Recall that we motivated this with the rms need to raise fresh nancing relatively
quickly, so that an information asymmetry between insiders and outside investors can not
be resolved in time. Again, we solve rst for the equilibrium in the interim period, before
turning to the optimal contract to raise initial nancing at t = 1.
4.1 Renancing (Weak Investor)
Game of Signaling A candidate for an equilibrium of the signaling game where each
"type" q plays a pure strategy is a triple of functions (R2 (q) ; ; ): R2 (q) is the security
issued by the owner-manager of type q, where we allow for R2(q) = ? to capture the
case where no new security is o¤ered;  is the investors posterior belief, which maps
the proposed security contract into the set of probability distributions over the type set
q 2 [0; 1]; and  represents the investors decision to renance the project, where  : R2 !
[0; 1] (with  = 1 corresponding to d = Y and  = 0 corresponding to d = N). Our
equilibrium concept is that of a Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium.
E¢ cient Renancing Recall that the initial security, R1, generates type-dependent
outside options at the renancing stage, both for the outside investor and for the owner-
manager. This makes our signaling game di¤erent from previous security design papers
such as Nachman and Noe (1994). In what follows, we show that this di¤erence drastically
changes the analysis. In particular, the e¢ cient outcome may be obtained, and even though
the outcome is pooling, there may not be cross-subsidization of less protable types q.
12To incorporate this into our model, we suppose that the stipulated cash ow realizations only apply
for some "type"  = h, while with positive probability the rm may be of some "type"  = l with
substantially worse cash ow realizations. The type  is observed before the renancing decision, but only
by "insiders" (cf. also Inderst, Münnich, and Mueller (2007) for a formalization along these lines).
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Proceeding in analogy to the case with a strong investor, we rst dene a security
R2 = bRM that will allow e¢ cient renancing. (Here, the superscript M denotes the
present case where the (owner-)manager makes the o¤er.) The security bRM is dened by
the requirement
vY ( bRM ; q) = vN  R1; q for all q.
Hence, with bRM the investor would be indi¤erent between renancing the rm and not
renancing it for all q. More explicitly, this obtains
 bRM = (pNG   pNB)
(pY G   pY B)R
1; (15)
bRMl = R1l + pNBR1   pY B bRM +K2: (16)
If such a security was accepted by the investor, it would allow the owner-manager to extract
all of the surplus obtained from renancing. The key feature of security bRM is that it is
"beliefs-free" for the investor: Regardless of the rms protability type, the investor is
indi¤erent between retaining his old claim R1 without renancing and exchanging it forbRM after investing additionally K2. Clearly, if no such initial nancing, R1, were in place,
as in standard models of security design under private information, this would be feasible
only if the new security were riskless debt. Then - by denition - the value of the security
would not depend on the rms protability. Instead, the value of bRM does depend on the
rms type and thus on the owner-managers private information. However, when there is
initial nancing in place, what matters is that the di¤erence between the rm value under
the new and the old security does not depend on the type.
We now argue that provided that bRM is feasible, for given R1, renancing is obtained
if and only if it is e¢ cient, i.e., for all q > qFB but not for all q < qFB, and that it is
indeed obtained through issuing R2 = bRM . As a rst step in the argument, note that the
investor will accept bRM whenever it is o¤ered. To be precise, observe that by marginally
increasing either bRMl or  bRM , the investors preference for accepting can be made strict.
This implies that any type q > qFB can ensure himself (arbitrarily close to) the full
surplus from renancing, so that there can be no "cross-subsidization" among types. This
also implies that there is no renancing for all q < qFB, as the contract rules out cross-
subsidization across types. Next, note that for given q there clearly exists more then one
renancing contract R2 satisfying vY (R2; q) = vN (R1; q), so that for this type the investor
is made indi¤erent between renancing and not renancing. However, if such a contract
20
R2 were not equal to bRM , then by construction of bRM there would be types q0 > q or
types q < q0 for which the aforementioned cross-subsidization would now be feasible. This
is why in equilibrium renancing must be obtained with R2 = bRM .13
Proposition 4 Security bRM is feasible at the renancing stage t = 2 if
xl  R1l +
pY GpNB   pNGpY B
pY G   pY B R
1 +K2: (17)
Then, in the case with a weak investor, renancing is obtained when q > qFB and not
obtained when q < qFB. Types qFB < q < 1 uniquely o¤er bRM , where bRM is atter from
the investors perspective than the initial security R1: bRMl  R1l and  bRM  R1 (the
inequalities are strict if R1 > 0).
Proof. See Appendix.
The existence of a "rst-best" security bRM , provided that condition (17) is satised,
distinguishes the outcome of our game of signaling from the previous security design lit-
erature where nancing is raised under private information. This follows from the type-
dependence of the outside option of the investor. In a standard model where no initial
security is in place, the investor strictly prefers to nance a higher type, so that he is
willing to accept a less favorable security. This makes it strictly preferable for all types to
mimic a higher type. This is no longer the case when an initial security is in place. Then,
also the value of the initial security strictly increases in the rms protability, making
the investor less inclined to accept a new security in exchange for renancing. Under the
rst-best security bRM these two countervailing forces just balance.
Observe next that bRM must be atter than R1: Renancing increases the upside proba-
bility in the good state relative to that in the bad state. To ensure that the owner-manager
can extract all of the net surplus for all q, the new contract must give the investor less
from the upside and more when the low cash ow is realized.
Equilibrium Security When Renancing is Ine¢ cient If condition (17) is not
satised, then bRM is not feasible. Extracting the full surplus from renancing and ensuring
13Strictly speaking, this argument does not apply at the boundaries q = qFB and q = 1, where incentive
compatibility can be ensured with a atter or steeper contract, respectively, provided that condition (17) is
slack so that the construction is feasible. The realizations of q = 0 and q = 1 are, however, zero-probability
events.
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renancing only when this is e¢ cient is then no longer feasible for the owner-manager. In
fact, there is no longer an equilibrium in which a type q o¤ers some security R2 and extracts
the full surplus, while being the highest type to issue R2.: There will be cross-subsidization
in case renancing is obtained.
To see this, suppose (17) does not hold. Consider some type q = qH and suppose
that vY (R2; qH) = vN(R1; qH) holds for some security R2. Now, it is no longer possible to
make R2 "at enough" from the investors perspective, implying that vY (R2; q) intersects
with vN (R1; q) from below at qH . Therefore, for all q < qH that o¤er this contract, the
investor would realize strictly less from providing renancing than under his outside option
of not doing so. Clearly, any such q < qH would then strictly prefer R2 over any other
contract that would allow this type to extract just the respective surplus from renancing.
Hence, if qH is the highest type (in a pool) issuing R2, he will extract strictly less than
"his surplus". A key insight that is shared with much of the literature on security design
with adverse selection (see, in particular, Nachman and Noe, 1994) is that the degree of
such "cross-subsidization" is lowest when, in a given pool, the respective security is debt.
Intuitively, the di¤erence vY (R2; q)  vN(R1; q), which is strictly increasing in q, becomes
atter if debt is issued, as debt is least "information-sensitive" to the private information
q.
Following this literature (e.g., Nachman and Noe, 1994; DeMarzo and Du¢ e, 1999; or
DeMarzo et al., 2005), we now apply criterion D1 to rene the out-of-equilibrium beliefs
(Cho and Kreps, 1987; Ramey, 1996). Roughly speaking, if type q0 has a weak incentive to
deviate to some security eR2, while type q has a strict incentive, then the investor should
put probability zero on type q0 making this deviation. (A formal denition is contained
in the proof of the subsequent proposition.) Then, in equilibrium all type must o¤er a
(pooling) debt contract as, otherwise, the highest type in a pool would credibly deviate
by o¤ering a atter renancing contract to the investor.
Proposition 5 Take the case with a weak investor at t = 2, where we apply the renement
D1 for the resulting game of signaling. Suppose condition (17) does not hold, so that bRM
is not feasible and there will be cross-subsidization in case of renancing. Then, in any
rened equilibrium there is a cuto¤ qM so that all types q < q

M do not renance while
all types q > qM renance. Renancing is obtained for all q  qM through the same debt
contract R2 (i.e., R2l = xl).
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Proof. See Appendix.
Note that Proposition 4 and 5 joint imply that the renancing security is now always
atter than the original security R1, irrespective of whether there is cross-subsidization or
not. Dene next for given initial security R1 a pooling debt security R2 = RP for which
the investor is just indi¤erent to renancing: RP =
 
xl;R
P

and qM jointly satisfyZ 1
qM

vY
 
RP ; q
  vN  R1; q dF (q)
1  F (qM)
= 0; (18)
uY
 
RP ; qM
  uN  R1; qM = 0:
Note that qM < qFB, as there is cross-subsidization of lower types under renancing.
Hence, there is overinvestment at the renancing stage. The outcome where all q  qM
pool at this particular (break-even) debt contract can be supported by beliefs that satisfy
the imposed renement D1. However, D1 does not eliminate other pooling equilibria with
debt where the investor is left with a strictly positive "rent" under renancing: D1 uniquely
pins down the shape of the renancing security, but not the level. In what follows, we now
impose the common restriction that the investor just breaks even, so that the equilibrium
at t = 2 is uniquely pinned down by (18), provided that condition (17) does not hold.14
4.2 Raising Initial Finance (Weak Investor)
Recall that at t = 1 there is no private information and nancing can be raised at com-
petitive terms. The owner-manager thus maximizesZ qM
0
 
sN (q)  vN
 
R1; q

dF (q) +
Z 1
qM
 
sY (q)  vY
 
R2; q

dF (q) ;
subject to the ex ante participation constraints of the investorZ qM
0
vN
 
R1; q

dF (q) +
Z 1
qM
vY
 
R2; q

dF (q)  K1; (19)
where qM and R
2 = RP are determined either from (18), when (17) does not hold, or from
qM = qFB and R
2 = bRM , when (17) holds. Suppose rst that there is ine¢ ciency at the
14In fact, it can be shown that this is also the unique equilibrium outcome if there is competition by
outside investors at t = 2. Precisely, suppose there are at least two new outside investors who could o¤er
to renance K2 and, at the same time, to buy out the incumbent investor. To preserve the bargaining
power of the owner-manager, assume that the owner-manager must agree rst to such a proposal, before
it is passed on to the incumbent investor. Then, RP is the unique outcome in this game of competition.
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renancing stage. We present below a simple condition when this is the case in equilibrium
and show that then (19) binds. The owner-manager is the residual claimant in t = 1. His
aim is thus to maximize the expected surplus at t = 1. That is, the security she o¤ers in
the initial period should be designed so that the gap between the cuto¤s qM and qFB is
minimal.
Proposition 6 Suppose there is overinvestment at the renancing stage. Then, it is
uniquely optimal for the rm to raise initial nancing through a levered equity contract,
R1l = 0.
Proof. See Appendix.
Levered equity is the steepest security from the investors perspective and thus the
attest security from the owner-managers perspective. Recall that, presently, with a weak
investor the ine¢ ciency at t = 2 is caused by overinvestment, as also types [qM ; qFB) receive
renancing under the pooling (debt) contract. Raising the initial amount K1 through
levered equity nancing preserves the rms "debt capacity". That is, the renancing
security R2 can then be made atter relative to the initial security R1. This limits cross-
subsidization and thus improves e¢ ciency by pushing up the marginal type qM .
Recall now that when the rst-best investment is feasible at t = 2, so that the cuto¤
satises qM = qFB, the "rst-best security" R
2 = bRM is atter than R1. Proposition 7
derives a condition when e¢ ciency is feasible. We have thus arrived at the following result.
Proposition 7 Take the case with a weak investor at t = 2. Then, the rst-best renanc-
ing outcome (qM = qFB) is obtained when
xl  K2 + pNBpY G   pY BpNG
(pY G   pY B) pN(bq)K1 + (pNG   pNB) pY (bq)(pY G   pY B) pN(bq) max (0; K1   pN(bq)x) ; (20)
while otherwise there is overinvestment with qM < qFB. In either case, the security that
is held by outside investors after renancing at t = 2 is unambiguously atter from the
investors perspective than the initial security (R2 < R1 and R2l > R
1
l ).
Proof. See Appendix.
The intuition for condition (20) is straightforward given the previous discussion and
condition (17), which showed when bRM is feasible for given R1. If xl is large enough,
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the owner-manager can ensure that the investor just breaks even while at the same time
making R1 su¢ ciently steep, so that subsequently the "rst-best" security bRM is feasible
at t = 2. When condition (20) holds strictly, there is again some leeway to choose the
initial security R1, while still ensuring that subsequent nancing is raised e¢ ciently. Still,
for any optimal choice R1, renancing will lead to a strictly atter security for the investor:
He will receive less from the upside, but he is more protected on the downside.
5 Implications and Evidence
We argued in Section 3 that the strong-investor case may better describe situations in
which the rm enters into a relationship with an investor. We also discussed how the
characterized securities (R1; R2) could then describe a sequence of renegotiation-proof
contracts. In Section 4, we considered the polar case in which it is the owner-manager who
has full bargaining power at the renancing stage. One interpretation that we o¤ered so far
is that this represents a competitive market for nancing also at t = 2, as the incumbent
investor has no privileged information. Alternatively, the owner-managers bargaining
power at t = 2 could come from her threat to withhold essential human capital that is
needed to grow the business (cf. Hart and Moore, 1994). Hence, the weak-investor case
may also describe the nancing of rms that depend heavily on human capital provided
by insiders. Outside investors may have low bargaining power also in countries with weak
protection of their rights or with weak legal enforcement of these rights. We explore the
respective interpretations in more detail in what follows, deriving various implications from
our model of nancial contracting.
Our stylized model of a rms dynamic contracting problem obtains implications both
for a rms choice of nancing under asymmetric information and for its change of leverage
over time. The respective results in Propositions 3 and 7 imply that the change in leverage
depends crucially on whether the rm has access to competitive nancing also when it must
raise nancing under asymmetric information (at short notice) or whether it is then locked
into a relationship with an incumbent outside investor.
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5.1 Start-Up Financing and Young Firm Financing
A suitable environment to test the contrasting predictions is the nancing of young rms
with growth potential. In this case, as noted above, we can take the two-stage nature of our
model literally. Initially, when marketing her idea, we stipulate that the owner-manager
can bridge any information asymmetry vis-à-vis outside investors.15 At a later stage,
however, when fresh nancing has to be raised, probably at short notice, the information
gap with outside investors may have widened as only the owner-manager is involved in the
rms day-to-day operations. Also, there may then be insu¢ cient time to credibly divulge
all relevant information to investors. We now argue that the contrasting implications of
our model are particularly suitable to match the rich evidence from the recent literature
on start-up and young rm nancing.
Following the empirical contributions of Gompers (1995) and Kaplan and Strömberg
(2003), several theoretical papers have tried to explain why venture capitalists provide
funds in exchange for senior securities with the option of converting them into junior
ones (e.g., Berglöf, 1994; Cornelli and Yosha, 1997; Hellmann, 2006). Our results for the
strong-investor case are consistent with this observation (cf. our previous interpretations
in terms of convertible securities), albeit in contrast to the extant theoretical literature
our characterization focuses on the distribution of cash ows rather than the contingent
allocation of control rights. Our model also has richer implications as these convertible
securities do not always arise in equilibrium. The resulting contrasting implications allow
us to organize the richer ndings in the recent empirical literature. This literature has taken
a more di¤erentiated view, showing that convertible debt and preferred equity are less
common in start-up nance under di¤erent legal environments (Lerner and Schoar, 2005;
Cumming 2008; Kaplan et al., 2007). Lerner and Schoar (2005) have shown that while
private equity rms in countries with common law or strong legal enforcement often use
convertible preferred stock, common stock is the favored instrument in weak enforcement
and civil law countries. This is consistent with our results, as we predict a switch from
senior to junior nancing when the investor is strong in t = 2 and the opposite when the
investor is weak. Also Kaplan et al. (2007) nd that in countries with weaker creditor
15In fact, it has sometimes been argued that at this stage it is often the investor who, due to his
industry knowledge as a "long-run" player, may be better able to gauge the prospects of a business plan
(e.g., Inderst and Müller 2006).
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rights equity is more frequently issued in rst rounds. Further, the more successful (and
thus possibly stronger) rms that have issued equity in earlier rounds switch to more senior
securities in later rounds.16
Hellmann et al. (2008) analyze banksprivate equity investments in start-up rms.
They nd that banks direct their equity investments towards later stages of the devel-
opment of start-ups. The same banks are then signicantly more likely to subsequently
grant a loan (i.e. debt nancing) to these rms. This nding, which is conrmed by Fang
et al. (2010), is in line with our predictions when we apply the following reasoning. In
contrast to specialized venture capitalists, banks may lack specic industry knowledge as
well as the management skills that are required, in particular, at the early stage. One
may thus presume that rms obtaining risk capital from banks may be less likely to nd
themselves locked-in in the future. This translates to our weak-investor case, for which
the prediction of a shift from equity to debt nancing is in line with the aforementioned
empirical observations.
5.2 Long-Term vs. Short-Term Financial Strategy
As noted in the Introduction, though our stylized model has only two periods, we interpret
our results also in terms of a rms long-term and short-term nancial strategy. Our
motivation for this is as follows. We stipulate that information asymmetry should be
more relevant when nancing is needed at short notice, e.g., to realize an investment
opportunity that is open only for a short time. Instead, when a rm chooses its long-
term (or target) nancial structure, this choice should be plagued less by information
asymmetry. The rm should then have time to credibly bridge or at least signicantly
narrow an informational gap vis-à-vis outside investors. These two choices correspond to
the security design problems in t = 2 and t = 1 of our model. In particular, the security
that is held by outside investors after renancing in t = 2 may represent a rms temporary
deviation from its long-term nancial strategy.
When we take this perspective, an application of our weak-investor case yields the fol-
lowing implications. Large rms with access to capital markets may choose "armslength"
nancing as a long-term capital strategy, so that even in t = 2 of our model they will
face a competitive nancial market (albeit one plagued by information asymmetry). Fama
16Kaplan et al. (2007) interpret this as a sign of learning that US-style contracts are more e¢ cient.
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and French (2005) nd that equity issuance is often observed in companies that are not
under duress. They interpret this as a violation of Myers and Majlufs (1984) pecking
order theory (cf. also Leary and Roberts, 2010). Our model shows that this allows rms
to preserve their "debt capacity" (cf. Lemmon and Zender, 2009), and we predict that, in
line with the pecking order, debt nancing will be chosen if nancing is needed at short no-
tice. Put di¤erently, rms that expect to have continuing access to a competitive nancial
market should use equity issuances to bring their nancing in line with their target capital
structure, while short-term deviations are observed jointly with fresh debt nancing.
We obtain strikingly di¤erent predictions for rms that raise nancing from (relation-
ship) investors who hold bargaining power in the future, when additional nancing is
needed at relatively short notice. These rms should choose high leverage as their target
capital structure, which preserves "equity capacity". Deviations from their long-term cap-
ital structure should thus involve the issuance of equity rather than debt (or, likewise, the
conversion of outstanding securities into more junior claims). Interestingly, for these rms
debt would thus represent the preferred source of nancing when information asymmetries
are not an issue, which is in line with the survey evidence in Graham and Harvey (2001).
It is further the predominant choice for small rms that often obtain loans from a single
bank with which they have close ties (Petersen and Rajan, 1994; Detragiache et al. 2000).
The ndings of Leary and Roberts (2010) and Gomes and Phillips (2005) suggest that
smaller growth rms will indeed issue debt when asymmetric information is not a factor,
so as to preserve "equity capacity" for the long run.
6 Conclusion
We develop a dynamic theory of a rms security design and optimal capital structure.
The key linkage between the rms choice of initial nancing, which is raised "for the
long-term" under symmetric information, and its subsequent nancing under asymmetric
information is that the former a¤ects the "outside options" for both insiders and outside
investors when new nancing must be raised. We nd that the models implications for the
optimal nancial structure and its change over time di¤er sharply depending on whether
the bargaining power at the renancing stage lies (more) with the rm, as it faces a
competitive capital market, or with initial investors.
If incumbent investors have bargaining power at the renancing stage, ine¢ ciency in
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the form of underinvestment may arise, as they attempt to extract higher "rents" from
better informed insiders (the "owner-manager" in our model). Instead, a problem of
overinvestment is likely if bargaining power lies with the better informed insiders.
If initial investors have bargaining power when nancing is needed in the future, the
rm will raise additional nancing through reducing leverage. Intuitively, in this case
a rms long-term (target) capital structure preserves "equity capacity", as this reduces
underinvestment in the future. In contrast, if bargaining power is in the hands of the rm
also when future nancing is needed, then the initial (or long-term) leverage decision serves
to reduce the subsequent overinvestment problem: The rm preserves its "debt capacity",
as it seeks renancing through issuing debt in the future.
We show that our richer implications, in contrast to most standard theories of security
design under asymmetric information, are largely in line with the sometimes contrasting
recent evidence in the literature. Our polar cases with strong or weak investors may shed
light on cross-country di¤erences in start-up and young rm nancing, as well as di¤erences
between early- and later-stage nancing. We also related our results to a rms choice of
target nancial structure vis-à-vis temporary deviations that are due to its need to raise
nancing at short term under problems of asymmetric information. Admittedly, these
implications are somewhat tentative as our model is highly stylized, allowing only for two
periods. Hence, this perspective could be explored further in a model with an open time
horizon. Further, though we showed how our restriction on the amount of nancing that
is raised initially (or, for that matter, for the long term) can be endogenized, a rm may
hold free cash as part of its optimal nancial strategy when the agency problems that this
engenders are not too large.
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Appendix A Omitted Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1. The proof follows from a sequence of auxiliary results.
Claim 1. The rst-best security bR is feasible if and only if condition (9) holds.
Proof. Note rst that if the initial security R1 is feasible, then from x R1  0 and
from the construction of  bR in (5) we also have that x  bR  0. Further, as condition
(1) implies that pY G  pY B > pNG  pNB, we have from (5) that  bR  0. To see next thatbRl  xl holds, we substitute (5) into (6) and obtain
bRl = R1l   pY GpNB   pY BpNGpY G   pY B
 
x R1 : (A.1)
This implies from (1) that bRl < R1l and thus also bRl < xl, given that R1 was feasible. The
remaining condition is thus that bRl  0, which from (A.1) is just condition (9). From this
it also follows that (9) is necessary for bR to be feasible. Q.E.D.
The next claim establishes that by optimality ofR2; the set of owner-manager types that
accepts, q 2 A, is always characterized by a cuto¤ q. We argue to a contradiction, showing
that if there existed a security R2 so that the owner-manager would prefer acceptance for
low but not for high q, then the rst-best contract bR would be feasible, instead. Then, as
argued in the main text, it is clearly optimal to o¤er bR.
Claim 2. If a security R2 satisfying uY (R2; 0) > uN(R1; 0) together with uY (R2; 1) <
uN(R
1; 1) is feasible, then also the rst-best security bR is feasible.
Proof. Note rst that from the assumed inequalities uY (R2; 0) > uN(R1; 0) (owner-
manager prefers renancing for q = 0) and uN(R1; 1) > uY ( bR2; 1) (owner-manager prefers
no-renancing for q = 1),  bR < R2 must hold to ensure that the slope of uY (R2; q) is
strictly smaller than that of uY ( bR; q). But then uY (R2; 0) > uY ( bR; 0) implies that R2l < bRl.
By the assumed feasibility of R2, we have from this that bRl > 0, so that (9) holds strictly.
Q.E.D.
From Claims 1-2 renancing takes place whenever q  q (with q = qFB if bR is
feasible). It is straightforward to rule out optimality of the case q = 1 (zero probability of
33
renancing). If q < 1, then the cuto¤is pinned down by the requirement that uY (R2; q) =
uN(R
1; q) (cf. also (7)).
Claim 3. Levered-equity with R2l = 0 is the uniquely optimal security for the investor if
the rst-best security bR is not feasible.
Proof. We argue to a contradiction. Suppose that, so as to implement some q 2 [0; 1],
another security R2 with R2l > 0 were optimal. Choose now eR2 = (0; eR2) so that
uY ( eR2; q) = uN (R1; q), which implies that the owner-managers acceptance set, [q; 1],
remains unchanged, while at q the investors conditional expected payo¤does not change:
vY ( eR2; q) = vY (R2; q). However, as uY ( eR2; q) = uY (R2; q) together with eR2l = 0 < R2l
must imply that  eR2 > R2, we have that vY ( eR2; q)  vY (R2; q) > 0 holds for all q > q.
Thus, provided it is feasible, the investor is indeed strictly better o¤ under the newly
constructed contract eR2.
It remains to show that eR2 is indeed feasible. By the assumed feasibility of R2 and
construction of eR2, this is the case if  eR2  x. (The other feasibility restrictions oneR2 are satised by feasibility of R2.) From uY ( eR2; q) = uY (R2; q) and eR2l = 0, we can
obtain
 eR2 = R2l
pY B + q (pY G   pY B) + R
2;
so that  eR2  x holds whenever
0   R2l + (pY B + q (pY G   pY B))
 
x R2 : (A.2)
However, (A.2) is implied by the assumption that the rst-best security is not feasible,
i.e., that (9) does not hold. To see this, note rst that from the denition of q, i.e.
uY (R
2; q) = uN (R1; q), condition (A.2) is equivalent to
0   R1l + (pNB + q (pNG   pNB))
 
x R1 : (A.3)
As, by assumption, bR is not feasible, it holds from transforming the "rst-best condition"
(9) that
0 <  R1l +

pY GpNB   pY BpNG
pY G   pY B
 
x R1
<  R1l + (pNB + q (pNG   pNB))
 
x R1 ;
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where the last inequality holds for any q. But this is just what we needed to show
(condition (A.3)). Q.E.D.
To conclude the proof of Proposition 1, we solve the investors program when bR is not
feasible. For this observe that from the indi¤erence condition of the owner-manager at q,
(7), we have that
R2 = x  R
2
l  R1l + [pNB + q (pNG   pNB)] (x R1)
pY B + q (pY G   pY B) ; (A.4)
from which we obtain explicitly
dR2
dq
=
(R2l  R1l ) (pY G   pY B) + (pNBpY G   pY BpNG) (x R1)
[pY B + q (pY G   pY B)]2
> 0; (A.5)
where the inequality follows as R2l = 0 when (9) does not hold.
We can next substitute for the acceptance set A = [q; 1] into the investors objective
function (3), where q is given by the indi¤erence condition for the owner-manager (cf.
condition (7)). Di¤erentiating with respect to q, we have the rst-order condition (cf.
also (10))
  [sY (q)  sN(q)] f (q) + dR
2
dq
Z 1
q
dvY (R
2; q)
dR2
dF (q) = 0;
where the rst term follows from sd(q) = ud (Rt; q) + vd (Rt; q) and (7). As dR
2
dq > 0,
dvY (R
2; q)
dR2
= pY B + q(pY G   pY B);
while sY (q)  sN(q) is strictly increasing and equal to zero when q = qFB, we have that
q > qFB. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 2. The proof is by contradiction. Suppose that R1 with R1l < xl
were optimal and that there is ine¢ ciency at t = 2. By Proposition 1 the investor chooses
a security R2 = (0;R2) that implements a cuto¤ qold > qFB. Note that we relegate to
the end of the proof the argument why, in the equilibrium of the whole game, the investor
must always choose the most e¢ cient cuto¤ from his optimal correspondence and thus
plays a pure strategy. We proceed in several steps.
Step 1. We start by constructing eR1 = (xl; eR1) together with eR2 = (0; eR2) so that
two conditions are satised: The owner-manager is still indi¤erent at his old cuto¤ qold
35
and, holding this cuto¤ xed, the ex ante payo¤ for both parties stays the same. By
construction, it then holds that
0 =
Z qold
0
h
vN( eR1; q)  vN(R1; q)i dF (q) + Z 1
qold
h
vY ( eR2; q)  vY (R2; q)i dF (q) ; (A.6)
together with uY (R2; qold) = uN(R
1; qold) and uY ( eR2; qold) = uN( eR1; qold). To ease exposi-
tion, let
bpN : = pNB + (pNG   pNB)Z qold
0
q
dF (q)
F (qold)
;
bpY : = pY B + (pY G   pY B)Z 1
qold
q
dF (q)
1  F (qold)
:
Further, let pd (q) := pdB + q (pNG   pNB) be dened as in (13) in the main text. Recall
also that, for given q and R1, R2 is given in (A.4). Plugging into (A.6) we have
0 =

xl  R1l + bpN  eR1  R1F (qold)
+
bpY
pY (qold)

xl  R1l + pN(qold)

 eR1  R1 (1  F (qold)) ;
from which we can express  eR1 as
 eR1 = R1   xl  R1lbpN
 
pY (q

old)F (q

old) + bpY (1  F (qold))
pY (qold)F (q

old) +
pN (q

old)bpN bpY (1  F (qold))
!
: (A.7)
Step 2. We now show that, if o¤ered eR1 in the initial period, the investor will actually
o¤er a di¤erent security R
2 6= eR2 at t = 2 that implements a strictly lower cuto¤. For this
purpose we look at the expected payo¤ of the investor at t = 2 when he is faced with R1
or eR1, respectively, and then apply monotone comparative statics.
As the second security is levered equity with R2l = eR2l = 0, the indi¤erence condition
of the owner-manager at a cuto¤ q gives the respective value R2 as a unique function of
R1 and q only (cf. (A.4)). We use R2 (q; R1) and R2(q; eR1), making thereby explicit
that R2() presently denotes a function. Next, we dene the investors expected payo¤
at t = 2 for some q and an initial contract R1 by
V
 
q; R1

:=
Z q
0
vN
 
R1; q

dF (q) +
Z 1
q
vY
 
R2; q

dF (q) : (A.8)
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Dening V (q; eR1) accordingly, we now show that the di¤erence V (q; eR1)  V (q; R1) is
decreasing in q. (Importantly, note that q is not an optimal selection from the investors
optimization problem at this point.) After some transformations we have
d
dq
h
V (q; eR1)  V  q; R1i (A.9)
=
Z 1
q
pY (q)
 
dR2(q; eR1)
dq
  dR
2 (q; R1)
dq
!
dF (q) :
Next, using (A.5) and (A.7), we obtain an explicit expression for the second term under
the integral in (A.9). Importantly, observe that eR1 is dened as a function of qold and not
q. We have
dR2(q; eR1)
dq
  dR
2 (q; R1)
dq
=  
(xl  R1l ) (pY G   pY B) + (pNBpY G   pY BpNG)

 eR1  R1
pY (q)2
=
  (xl  R1l ) (pY G   pY B)
pY (q)2

 
1  (pNBpY G   pY BpNG)
(pY G   pY B) bpN pY (q

old)F (q

old) + bpY (1  F (qold))
pY (qold)F (q

old) +
pN (q

old)bpN bpY (1  F (qold))
!
<
  (xl  R1l ) (pY G   pY B)
pY (q)2

1  (pNBpY G   pY BpNG)
(pY G   pY B) bpN

< 0;
where for the rst inequality we use that pN (qold) =bpN > 1, and for the second inequality
we use that bpN > pNB. From (A.9), it follows, therefore, that
dV (q; eR1)
dq
<
dV (q; R1)
dq
.
Thus, the di¤erence V (q; eR1) V (q; R1) decreases in q. By standard monotone selection
arguments, strictly decreasing di¤erences imply the following: Any optimal cuto¤ qnew that
the investor chooses given eR1 is lower than any optimal cuto¤ qold that he selects given
R1, so that qnew < q

old .
Step 3. In this step we show that the owner-manager is indeed better o¤with the consid-
ered deviation. Observe rst that by construction both the owner-manager and the investor
are ex ante indi¤erent between (R1; R2) and ( eR1; eR2), when holding q = qold constant. But
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as qnew < q

old, it follows from (A.5) (dR
2=dq > 0) that for the new optimal second-period
contract, which implements some qnew, we have that R
2(qnew; eR1) < R2(qold; eR1). De-
note this contract by R
2
. Hence, uY (R
2
; q) > uY ( eR2; q) holds for all q, and the ex ante
expected payo¤ of the owner-manager with ( eR1; R2) is strictly higher than with either
( eR1; eR2) or (R1; R2); respectively. To nish this step, note that by optimality of R2 the
investor is also at least weakly better o¤with ( eR1; R2) than with ( eR1; eR2), so that ( eR1; R2)
satises the investors break-even condition. Taken together, this contradicts the optimal-
ity of R1.
To conclude the proof, we can make use of the preceding results to show that, as as-
serted in the main text, in equilibrium the investor chooses a pure strategy and, thereby,
implements the most e¢ cient (i.e., lowest) q in case his optimal contractual choice at
t = 2 is not uniquely determined. Given a debt security at t = 1, one can use the indi¤er-
ence condition (7) to express the second-stage levered equity security R2 as a function of
R1 and q. We can thus write V (q ;R1) instead of V (q; R1) (cf. expression (A.8)).
Further, we use Q = argmaxV (q;R1) to denote the optimal choice correspondence
subject to (12). Observe now that given R1, V (q;R1) is strictly submodular in q and
R1 :
@2V (q;R1)
@q@R1
=  (pNBpY G   pY BpNG)
pY (q)2
Z 1
q
pY (q) dF (q) < 0:
Therefore, again by monotonic selection arguments, relaxing the investors ex ante partic-
ipation constraint by increasing R1 results in a lower set Q. Since Q is monotonic, it
must be almost everywhere a singleton and continuous. Then, while the investors pay-
o¤ is continuous in R1 everywhere, the owner-managers expected payo¤ is continuous
a.e. and, where Q is not a singleton, the owner-manager strictly prefers the lowest (most
e¢ cient) value q = minQ. Consequently, analogously to a tie-breaking condition, by
optimality for the owner-manager the investor must choose q = minQ with probability
one in equilibrium. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 3. Recall from Proposition 1 that if the investor implements
qFB, then uN (R1; q) = uY ( bR; q) holds for all q 2 [0; 1]. Using this and the identity
sd (q) = vd (R
t; q) + ud (R
t; q) to plug into (12), if the investor just breaks even at t = 1,
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one can express R1 as
R1 = x  SFB   (xl  R
1
l )
pN(bq) : (A.10)
A rst-period security that satises (A.10) is feasible if
xl  R1l  0;
x  R1 = x  SFB   (xl  R
1
l )
pN(bq)  0;
R1l 

pNBpY G   pY BpNG
pY G   pY B

SFB   (xl  R1l )
pN(bq) ;
where the last inequality is just condition (9) from Proposition 1. These three conditions
can be rewritten as follows:
min (xl; xl + pN(bq)x  SFB)  R1l  maxxl   SFB; pNBpY G   pY BpNG(pNG   pNB)pY (bq) (SFB   xl)

:
Since the left-hand side must be greater than the right-hand side, it must be that
xl  max

xl   SFB; pNBpY G   pY BpNG
(pNG   pNB)pY (bq) (SFB   xl)

+max (0; SFB   pN(bq)x) :
Simple transformations yield condition (14). If (14) holds, by optimality for the owner-
manager we then have that q = qFB: The optimal securityR1 then maximizes joint surplus
and, by making the investor just break even, achieves the maximum feasible payo¤ for the
owner-manager.
We nally formalize the argument from the main text that in equilibrium q > qFB
if (14) does not hold. That is, though rst-best e¢ ciency could be achieved by granting
the investor a su¢ ciently large payo¤, this is not optimal. Using the optimality of debt,
consider the owner-managers optimal choice of R1. Di¤erentiating her expected prots
with respect to R1 yields at points of di¤erentiability of q(R1)
(sN (q
)  sY (q)) f (q) dq

dR1
  d
dR1
 Z q(R1)
0
vN
 
R1; q

dF (q) +
Z 1
q(R1)
vY
 
R2; q

dF (q)
!
  d
dq
 Z q(R1)
0
vN
 
R1; q

dF (q) +
Z 1
q(R1)
vY
 
R2; q

dF (q)
!
dq
dR1
=   (sY (q)  sN (q)) f (q) dq

dR1
 
bpNF (q) + pN (q)
pY (q)
bpY (1  F (q)) ;
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where we used that the third line is zero by the investors FOC at t = 2. Similarly,
dq=dR1 is computed from the solution to the investors optimization problem at t = 2
and, from (7), we use that R2 is a function of R1 in the last line. This expression is
strictly negative at q = qFB, since then the rst term is zero. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 4. To obtain condition (17), note rst that by construction
x   bRM  0 is always satised from feasibility of R1 and from condition (1). Further,bRMl  0 never binds as after substitution
bRMl = R1l + pNBpY G   pY BpNGpY G   pY B R1 +K2:
The remaining condition xl  bRMl transforms to (17). Having derived bRM this way, (1)
implies that  bRM  R1 and bRMl > R1l , where the inequalities are strict if R1 > 0.
By the arguments in the main text, in equilibrium renancing is obtained by types
q > qFB but not by types q < qFB, and types qFB < q < 1 must obtain renancing by
issuing bRM . Further, the o¤er is accepted with probability one. It is straightforward to
support this outcome as a Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium by adequately choosing out-of-
equilibrium beliefs. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 5. The proof follows from a series of results. Arguing that
vY (R
2; q) can only cross vN (R1; q) from below, we rst show that there is no equilibrium
in which the highest type that issues a certain security extracts the whole surplus from
renancing. For this result (Claim 2) we make use of the following auxiliary result.
Claim 1. If a security R2 satisfying vN (R1; 0) < vY (R2; 0) and vN (R1; 1) > vY (R2; 1)
is feasible, so that vY (R1; q) crosses vN(R1; q) from above, then also the rst-best securitybRM is feasible.
Proof. From the denition of bRM we have vY ( bRM ; 0) = vN (R1; 0) < vY (R2; 0) and
vY ( bRM ; 1) = vN (R1; 1) > vY (R2; 1), so it follows that R2 <  bRM to make sure that
the slope of vY (R2; q) is strictly smaller than that of vY ( bRM ; q). But then vY ( bRM ; 0) <
vY (R
2; 0) implies that R2l > bRMl . By assumed feasibility of R2, we therefore have that
xl > bRMl , so that (17) holds strictly. Hence, if (17) does not hold, vY (R2; q) can only cross
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vN (R
1; q) from below. Q.E.D.
Claim 2. For any security issued in equilibrium, the highest type that issues this security
extracts strictly less than the full surplus from renancing.
Proof. Observe rst that if some type qH has no incentive to mimic a higher type, the
same holds strictly for all types q < qH . Next, if some type q 2 [0; qFB] extracts more than
the full surplus, she must be pooling with some type q > qFB. Suppose therefore that qH 2
(qFB; 1] is the highest type that issues some security R2
 
qH

and that qH extracts (weakly)
more than the full surplus from renancing, i.e. vN(R1; qH)  vY (R2(qH); qH). From Claim
1 we know that for any feasible security R2(qH), vY (R2(qH); q) can only cross vN(R1; q)
from below. Hence, it must be that vN(R1; q) > vY (R2(qH); q)  vY (R2 (q) ; q) for q 2
[qFB; q
H), where the last inequality follows as by incentive compatibility: uY (R2(qH); q) 
uY (R
2 (q) ; q) and where R2 (q) is the equilibrium security issued by type q. Hence, in this
candidate equilibrium all types q 2 [qFB; qH) would extract more than the full surplus. We
have thus obtained a contradiction, as the investor is then always better o¤with his outside
option rather than renancing these types. Hence, it must be that vY (R2(qH); qH) >
vN(R
1; qH). Q.E.D.
We now dene more formally the renement D1.17 Let U( eR2; q; ) be the expected
payo¤ of the owner-manager when o¤ering a security eR2
U( eR2; q; ) := uY ( eR2; q) + (1  )uN  R1; q :
For each type q, determine the minimum probability of acceptance, (qj eR2), that would
make o¤ering eR2 weakly attractive
(qj eR2) = minf : U( eR2; q; )  U (q)g;
where U (q) denotes the equilibrium payo¤ of type q. Then, provided that this leads to a
non-empty set, D1 restricts the support of the investors beliefs to those types that would
nd eR2 attractive for the lowest probability of acceptance
Qdev( eR2) = q 2 [0; 1] j (qj eR2) = min
q0
(q0j eR2) :
17Originally, as discussed in Cho and Kreps (1987), D1 was dened for discrete type spaces. The
extension to continuous types follows, e.g., Ramey (1996) or DeMarzo et al. (2005).
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Claim 3. In an equilibrium satisfying D1, all types that obtain renancing o¤er the same
debt security.
Proof. This follows standard arguments (cf. Nachman and Noe, 1994), so we omit the
formal details of the proof for the sake of brevity. We showed that when the rst best is
not feasible, as (17) does not hold, then the highest type issuing a certain security, i.e., the
highest type in the respective "pool", never extracts the full surplus. This type would thus
strictly benet from "separating away" from the pool. Given that higher types strictly
prefer to share cash ow for the (less likely) low realization, this is possible under D1,
provided that the initial security was not debt. Clearly, it is not incentive compatible to
have more than one debt security in equilibrium. Finally, pooling with debt for all types
who receive renancing can be supported by beliefs that satisfy D1. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 6. Suppose rst that the investor just breaks even ex-ante, so
that
R1 =
K1  R1l
pN(bq) ;
R2 = x  R
2
l  R1l + pN(qM) (x R1)
pY (qM)
: (A.11)
(Recall that bq is the unconditional expectation of q.) Note that R2l = xl, so that we can
represent the equilibrium security R2 as a function of R1 and qM only. By plugging (A.11)
into (19), one can express the binding ex ante participation constraint of the investor
entirely as a function of R1l and q

M
K1 =
Z qM
0

R1l + pN(q)
K1  R1l
pN(bq)

dF (q) (A.12)
+
Z 1
qM
0@R2l + pY (q)
0@x  xl  R1l + pN(qM)

x  K1 R1l
pN (bq)

pY (qM)
1A K2
1A dF (q) :
Taking the total derivative of (A.12) allows us, therefore, to examine how a change in R1l
a¤ects the equilibrium cuto¤ qM at the interim stage, given that R
1 and R2 adjust so that
the investor has the same ex ante expected payo¤ under the old and the new equilibrium.
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From total di¤erentiation we obtain
0 =
"
(R1l + pN(q

M)R
1   xl   pY (qM)R2) f (qM)
+
R 1
qM
pY (q)
dR2
dqM
dF (q)
#
dqM (A.13)
+
"Z qM
0

1  pN(q)
pN(bq)

dF (q) +
Z 1
qM
pY (q)
pY (qM)

1  pN(q

M)
pN(bq)

dF (q)
#
dR1l ,
where for ease of exposition only we have plugged back in for Rt in the rst line. With
overinvestment, qM < qFB, the rst term in the rst line is positive. Also the second term
is positive, as dR2=dqM > 0.
18 Finally, the second line is also positive. To see this, note
that di¤erentiating the terms in front of dR1l with respect to q

M we haveZ 1
qM

pY (q)
pN(bq)

(pY GpNB   pNGpY B)  (pY G   pY B) pN(bq)
pY (qM)2

dF (q) < 0:
Further, these terms are zero at qM = 1, while q

M  qFB < 1. Taken together, from the
preceding observations on (A.13) we obtain dqM=dR
1
l < 0. As the owner-manager is the
residual claimant and as qM < qFB, we thus have that R
1
l is optimally chosen as small as
possible: R1l = 0.
It remains to show that it is optimal for the owner-manager to o¤er the investor a
contract for which he just breaks even at t = 1. For this it is su¢ cient to show that
qM decreases (i.e. becomes more ine¢ cient) as the investors ex-ante payo¤ increases. To
avoid new notation, note that we can likewise analyze a change in K1, while still assuming
that the investor just breaks even. Total di¤erentiation yields then
0 =
" 
pN(q

M)R
1   xl   pY (qM)R2

f (qM) +
Z 1
qM
pY (q)
dR2
dqM
dF (q)
#
dqM
+
"Z qM
0
pN(q)
pN(bq)dF (q) +
Z 1
qM
pY (q)
pY (qM)
pN(q

M)
pN(bq) dF (q)  1
#
dK1:
Since the terms in the second line are positive, it must be that dqM=dK1 < 0.
19 Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 7. We only have to check the feasibility requirements for R1 and
18See (A.11) and (A.5) and recall that R2l = xl.
19Similarly to above, to verify this note that di¤erentiating the second line with respect to qM yields
 
Z 1
qM

pY (q)
pN (bq) (pY GpNB   pNGpY B)pY (qM )2

dF (q) < 0:
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bRM :
xl  R1l  0;
x  R1 = K1  R
1
l
pN(bq)  0;
xl  bRMl = R1l + pNBpY G   pY BpNGpY G   pY B K1  R
1
l
pN(bq) +K2;
where the last condition is just (17) from Proposition 4. These conditions can be rewritten
as
R1l  min

(pY G   pY B) pN(bq)
(pNG   pNB) pY (bq)

xl  K2   pNBpY G   pY BpNG
(pY G   pY B) pN(bq)K1

; xl

; (A.14)
R1l  max (0; K1   pN(bq)x) ;
where we have already used that xl < K1. One can construct a feasible security R1 only if
the right-hand side in the rst line is greater than the right-hand side in the second line.
Note now that from xl < K1 the rst term on the right-hand side of (A.14) is the smallest.
We then have the requirement
(pY G   pY B) pN(bq)
(pNG   pNB) pY (bq)

xl  K2   pNBpY G   pY BpNG
(pY G   pY B) pN(bq)K1

  xl
=
pNBpY G   pY BpNG
(pNG   pNB) pY (bq) (xl  K1)  (pY G   pY B) pN(bq)(pNG   pNB) pY (bq)K2 < 0;
which after some transformations becomes condition (20) in the main text. Q.E.D.
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